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Introduction
The liability of auditors to the readers of financial statements and the auditors' report 
thereon has recently garnered national attention in the financial press, within the 
accounting profession and from securities regulators. Much of this attention arose from 
the May 1997 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of Hercules 
Managements Ltd. v. Ernst & Young1 and the refusal of the Supreme Court of Canada 
in November 1997 to hear an appeal from the B.C. Court of Appeal in Kripps v. 
Touche Ross.2
This paper is intended to provide an analysis of the relevant jurisprudence over the 
past 60 years, which culminated in Hercules Managements and Kripps. The analysis 
will examine the foundation and the development of the common law tort of negligent 
misrepresentation (or negligent misstatement), while attempting to provide insight into 
the rationale of the judiciary as it guided the development of the law underlying civil 
liability of auditors to third parties.
We will attempt to provide a tentative prediction of the future of auditor liability, 
particularly given the ever-growing need on the part of various users of financial 
information for new assurance services. Such a prediction can only be tentative, 
however, given the drastic changes taking place in the manner in which financial 
information is made available today to users and the role of auditors in providing 
assurance thereon.
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Auditors'Liability Generally
From a civil liability perspective, there are four principal sources of auditors' liability. 
First, certain statutes (notably securities legislation) impose liability on auditors 
and others who participate in the production of offering memoranda or prospectuses and 
in so doing, often set out specific rules that would govern that liability. Since these 
rules are statute-specific, we will not be dealing with them in this paper.
Second, an auditing engagement is a contract between the auditor and the company. 
Accordingly, the auditor will be liable to his client for breach of contract where he has 
failed to deliver the product or delivers something which is flawed. Although audit 
contracts tend to be fairly standard in practice across the country, it is possible for there 
to be specific differences from contract to contract which would have a bearing on 
liability issues. Moreover, certain concerns discussed by the Supreme Court of Canada 
in the Hercules decision regarding the spectre of indeterminate liability do not arise in 
a purely contractual setting, where there is only one professional and one client. 
Finally, the professional client relationship is a two-way street, with management being 
responsible for representing the truth to the auditor, which can give rise to fairly 
complex factual and legal questions on the issues of reliance and damages. For these 
reasons, contractual liability will not be a focus of this paper.
Third, the law of fiduciary duty is currently the subject of change and development 
in Canadian law. The Supreme Court of Canada decision in Hodgkinson v. Simms3 
made it apparent that the highest Court in Canada is prepared to find a fiduciary 
relationship more readily in a professional context than in an ordinary business context. 
The finding of a fiduciaiy relationship imposes serious additional obligations on the 
fiduciary and leaves her open to an assessment of damages which might be significantly 
greater than those damages which would normally be assessed at common law. Once 
again, we leave comment on that subject for others.
This brings us to the fourth principal source of auditors' liability, and the one on 
which we choose to focus, namely tort. Not too long ago (in the history of law), an 
action for damages arising out of negligently spoken words could not be sustained if the 
plaintiff merely suffered “pure economic loss”. It was only mid-way through this 
century that U.K. Courts accepted that a plaintiff who had not suffered physical loss 
or damage to his person or property, could sue for negligent misrepresentation.4
Given the recent vintage of this tort of negligent misrepresentation, it is not 
surprising that the rules which govern it are not yet clear and that there are very few
3 [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377.
* Hedley Byrne and Co. Ltd. v. Heller [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.).
cases in which the rules have actually been applied to specific fact situations. It is now 
relatively clear that there are five essential ingredients to the tort of negligent 
misrepresentation.5 First, there must be a duty of care between the plaintiff and the 
defendant based on a “special relationship” between them which justifies judicial 
intervention in their dispute. Second, the statement or representation which was made 
must be false or misleading. Third, the person who made the statement or 
representation must have done so negligently. Fourth, the plaintiff must have relied 
reasonably on the representation. Fifth, the plaintiff must have suffered damages as a 
result of that reliance.
As indicated above, although each of these issues raises specific legal complexities 
which at times can be difficult to apply to specific fact patterns, we will be considering 
the duty of care issue (the first issue cited above) and the standard of care issue (the 
third element cited above). Further, in order to offer insights as to where auditors and 
the tort of negligent misrepresentation are likely heading, it is necessary to consider 
where the law in Canada currently stands on these issues. Moreover, in order to 
understand the law as it reads today, one must understand the legal rationale of 
yesterday as expressed by courts in Canada, Britain and the United States. Hence, it is 
necessary to examine the past as well as the present before considering the future.
The Duty of Care
The Early Years
It may surprise disciples of British jurisprudence to read that the Americans addressed 
the subject matter of auditor liability some sixty years ago, and that American legal 
rulings were the predominant guiding light on the subject matter of auditor liability for 
the following thirty years. The American courts did not have any particular concerns 
about creating a new basis for liability. Nor, it would appear, were the courts in the 
U.S. concerned with issues such as the standard of care which society believed should 
govern the conduct of auditors, or the particular circumstances in which the report of 
the auditors was issued. To the Americans, the most litigated issue was the scope of the 
duty of care owed by auditors to third parties. In other words, just how far would the 
parameters of auditor liability in the U.S. be extended?
The leading American cases which formed the basis for the subsequent 
development in British jurisprudence of the tort of negligent misrepresentation were 
Ultramares Corporation v. Touche6 and Glanzer v. Shephard.1 In Ultramares the
5 Queen v. Cognos Inc., [1993] 1 S.C.R. 87.
‘ (1931) 174 N.E. 441.
7 (1922) 233 N.Y. 236 [hereinafter Glanzer].
auditors were retained to express an opinion on the financial statements of a publicly 
traded corporation. In these circumstances, it was to be expected that the issue of the 
scope of liability of the auditors to third parties would be argued before the Court, given 
the expected and actual widespread distribution of the financial statements and the 
auditor's report attached thereto. The critical issue, as described by the Court, was not 
the purpose — intended or actual — of the auditor's report, but rather, the number of 
the actual users of the audit report. Given the widespread distribution of the audit 
report, the Court concluded that the risk of “liability in an indeterminate amount for an 
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class”8 precluded the extension of the scope of 
the duty of care to the world at large. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled, in essence, that 
the auditors did not owe a duty of care to unforeseen or unintended users of their audit 
report, regardless of the particular use to which the report was actually put.
As circumstances might well dictate, the subsequent leading case from the U.S. — 
Glanzer— involved an auditor's report being used not only for the intended purposes, 
but, also, being used by the intended users of the report. In Glanzer, the Court focussed 
on the actual versus intended users of the audit report, and concluded that, since the 
actual users and the intended users were in fact one and the same, there was no concern 
regarding “liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time for an 
indeterminate class”. The purpose of the audit report — a special purpose report 
intended to facilitate an investment decision as opposed to a traditional year-end audit 
report on the financial statements of the enterprise — drew no special consideration 
from the Court. As we shall point out later, such a distinction has gained paramount 
importance in British and Canadian jurisprudence.
Thus, the purpose underlying the audit report appears to have played no significant 
role in early American jurisprudence on auditor liability. The only element of 
significance appears to have been the identity of the “users” of the audit report, and 
their relation ship to the extent of the scope of the duty of care to be imposed upon the 
accounting profession. Different considerations may have played a more pivotal role 
if Ultramares had not involved a publicly traded company, thereby precluding concerns 
about indeterminate liability to an indeterminate class of users. Nevertheless, the 
concerns of the American courts in these early cases with respect to the scope of the 
duty of care were to shape the development of British and Canadian jurisprudence for 
many years to follow.
The Developing Years
A number of early British cases witnessed a distinction by the courts between liability 
in negligence for physical loss or damage to one's person or property, and liability for 
economic loss. The distinction flowed, at least in part, from a concern that one should
* Supra, note 6 at 444.
not be held liable for one's spoken or written word to a party whom one may not have 
ever met, and with whom one had no contractual or fiduciary relationship. A number 
of other British cases denied any basis for liability in such circumstances. Hence, the 
law in England was, to say the least, rather limited in its usefulness to investors.
It was left to Lord Denning, in a dissenting judgement in Candler v. Crane 
Christmas & Co.9) to truly lay the foundation in British law for the tort of negligent 
misrepresentation. According to Lord Denning, “those persons... whose profession and 
occupation it is to examine books, accounts, and other things, and to make reports on 
which other people— other than their clients— rely in the ordinary course of business” 
are under a duty of care to these other people.10 Secondly, this duty of care is owed by 
accountants to clients and employers, to those to whom the accountants show the 
accounts, as well as to those whom the accountant knows the accounts will be shown, 
so as to induce these others to invest money or take some other action on them. 
However, there was not, according to Lord Denning, a duty to the world at large, since, 
in his view, accountants should not be held liable, once they submitted their accounts 
to their employer, without their knowledge or consent regarding the subsequent use of 
the report.
It is interesting to note that Lord Denning expressly introduced a “purpose” element 
into his decision (e.g., so as to induce these others to invest money or take some other 
action on the report). He extended the legal considerations beyond simply the question 
of the actual versus intended users of the report to a consideration of the purpose of the 
report. As a third element of liability, Lord Denning wrote:
[T]o what transactions does the duty of care extend? It extends, I think, only to those 
transactions for which the accountants knew their accounts were required ... the duty 
only extends to the very transactions in mind at the time.... I have confined the duty to 
cases where the accountant prepares his accounts and makes his report for the guidance 
of the very person in the very transaction in question.11
In introducing a “purpose” element into the analysis, Lord Denning elaborated on 
the concerns of indeterminate liability introduced by Justice Cardozo in Ultramares. 
He did not restrict the particular purposes for which the audit report must have been 
used in order to impose liability on the auditor other than to say that the report and its 
use must have been central to the “very transaction in question” giving rise to the claim 
(i.e. the very person and the very transaction test). It was in this fashion that Lord 
Denning proposed to limit the scope of the duty of care owed by auditors, whilst 
opening the door to liability for pure economic loss.
9 [1951] 2 K.B. 164 (C.A.) [hereinafter Candler]
10 Ibid: at 179.
u Ibid. at 182-183.
Lord Denning's dissent in Candler was approved by the House of Lords in Hedley 
Byrne. In that case, the Court ruled that the maker of the report in question was 
protected from liability by virtue of a disclaimer clause appended to his report. 
However, the Court took the opportunity to overrule the majority decision in Candler, 
and to approve Lord Denning's dissenting judgement therein.
The Supreme Court of Canada made the next significant contribution to the 
development of the tort of negligent misrepresentation with its decision in Haig v. 
Bamford.12 This case involved an audit of a privately-held company. The audit report 
was to be used, with the knowledge and consent of the auditor, to induce a third party 
to invest in the company as a shareholder.
Dickson J.'s reasons in Haig are informative for a number of reasons. First, he 
acknowledged that a traditional year-end audit could be considered as a “special 
purpose” audit report in those circumstances where the auditor recognizes or should 
recognize that his report will be used for purposes beyond the traditional stewardship 
function of management. Mr. Justice Dickson wrote:
The increasing growth and changing role of corporations in modem society has been 
attended by a new perception of the societal role of the profession of accounting. The 
day when the accountant served only the owner-manager of a company and was 
answerable to him alone has passed. The complexities of modem industry ... have led 
to marked changes in the role and responsibilities of the accountant, and in the reliance 
which the public must place on his work. The financial statements of the corporations 
upon which he reports can affect the economic interests of the general public as well as 
of shareholders and potential shareholders.13
Second, while the Court was prepared to extend the scope of the duty of care of an 
auditor of a privately held corporation, it was clearly cognizant of earlier decisions, 
which warned of the risks of unlimited liability. The Court balanced the need to protect 
the public against the need to protect auditors from indeterminate liability, essentially 
by adopting the rationale of Lord Denning in Candler. The Supreme Court of Canada 
chose not to determine liability strictly upon the basis of a test of foreseeability — a 
foregone conclusion in this particular case. However, Dickson J. concluded that the 
report was prepared for the guidance of a specific class of persons (the very potential 
investors known to the accountants) and for a specific class of transactions (the 
investment of equity, as previously made known to the accountants). In Haig, the 
auditors had knowledge of the general class of investors and knowledge of the general 
nature of the transaction that gave rise to the claim for negligence. This was sufficient 
to bring the auditors within the parameters of Lord Denning's dissent in Candler. These 
factors, to Dickson J., were sufficient to negate any concerns about the extending the
12 [1977] 1 S.C.R. 466.
13 Ibid. at 475-476.
scope of the duty of care owed by auditors to potential investors.
The Formative Years
Twenty years would pass before the Supreme Court of Canada would once again have 
the opportunity to issue its opinion on the tort of negligent misrepresentation in the 
context of an audit report. During the interim, the law on the subject was further 
elaborated upon, and made somewhat more confusing, by seemingly contradictory 
decisions in the House of Lords.
The Law Lords, in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council,14 formulated à two- 
part test for the purpose of finding liability. First, one must consider whether there 
existed such a relationship of “proximity” between wrongdoer and the plaintiff so as to 
impose a prima facie duty of care upon the former to the latter. Second, if such a 
relationship of “proximity” is found to exist, the court must then consider whether there 
are valid policy considerations that would negate such a prima facie duty of care. 
According to Lord Wilberforce,
if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to consider whether there 
are any considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or to limit the scope of the 
duty or the class of person to whom it is owed or the damages to which a breach of it 
may give rise.15
It is clear that the Court recognized that a reasonable foreseeability test alone might 
trigger an unlimited exposure of the maker of the statement to an extended class of 
recipients of the statement. Hence, consistent with previously expressed fears of 
indeterminate liability, the Law Lords formally expressed a “policy” consideration test 
in an attempt to protect auditors from unlimited liability.
Subsequent decisions of the House of Lords have cast doubt upon the continued 
acceptance in Britain of the two-part test enunciated by Lord Wilberforce in Anns. 
Hence, there is confusion in the British jurisprudence. In reality, these subsequent 
decisions appear to represent a refusal to accept the proposition that the complexities 
in the law regarding negligent misrepresentation can be reduced to a simple two-part 
test rather than an outright repudiation of the philosophy expressed by 
Lord Wilberforce.
A recent leading case from the House of Lords involving auditor liability is Caparo 
Industries v. Dickman et a/.16 The Caparo decision stands for several important 
postulates vis-à-vis auditor liability. In that case, the Plaintiffs were hostile takeover
14 [1978] A. C. 728, (H.L.).
15 Ibid, at 751-752.
16 [1990] 1 AU E. R. 568, (H.L.).
bidders who allegedly relied on the statutory audit of the target company. The 
Defendants were the auditors of the target.
To some readers, including former Justice La Forest of the Supreme Court of 
Canada, the House of Lords’ decision in Caparo represents an abandonment of the two- 
part test enunciated by Lord Wilberforce va. Anns}1 We share that assessment. The Law 
Lords believed that the Anns test represented an undue and unwelcome evolution of the 
law. Concerns about the scope of the duty of care caused the them to turn away from 
the “modem approach” in favor of “traditional categorization of distinct and 
recognizable situations” in attempting to assess such issues. Lord Bridge of Harwich, 
adopted the reasoning of Brenan J.of the High Court of Australia in Sutherland Shire 
Council v. Heyman:18
It is preferable, in my view, that the law should develop novel categories of negligence 
incrementally and by analogy with established categories, rather than by a massive 
extension of a prima facie duty of care restrained only by indefinable “considerations 
which ought to negative, or reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person 
to whom it is owed.19
In addition to an outright rejection of Lord Wilberforce's two-part test, the House 
of Lords in Caparo also expressed their views regarding the relationship between the 
auditors of a public company and the shareholders and potential shareholders of that 
company. The findings of the Court can be summarized as follows:
• No duty of care is owed to the world at large (i.e. potential investors who may 
rely upon the audited accounts and the audit report for investment purposes);
• The annual audit of a corporation — even that of a public company —is 
directed only towards assisting shareholders assess how well management has 
fulfilled their duty of stewardship of the assets of the corporation;
• While the statutory audit provisions found in companies legislation establishes 
a relationship between auditors and shareholders, such provisions do not 
necessarily establish a duty of care to existing or potential shareholders;
• Foreseeability of potential users of the report is not sufficient to establish 
liability on the part of the auditor; and
• A statutory audit is intended to protect primarily the company, not the interest
17 Anns supra note 14 at 498-499.
“ (1985) 60 A.L.R. 1 at pages 43 -  44.
19 Caparo supra note 16 at 574.
of individual shareholders or the interest of the public at large.
The Court in Caparo were determined to limit the expansion of the tort of negligent 
misrepresentation, particularly in relation to the auditing profession. Any consideration 
of establishing “rules of thumb” governing auditor liability, such as a prima facie duty 
of care owed by auditors to shareholders negated, in certain circumstances by policy 
considerations, was strongly rejected by the Lords. Lord Oliver of Aylmerton aptly 
summarizes the position of the Lords:
[I]it has to be recognized that to search for any single formula which will serve as a 
general test of liability is to pursue a will-o'-wisp ... the attempt to state some general 
principle which will determine liability in an indefinite variety of circumstances serves 
not to clarify the law but merely to bedevil its development in a way which corresponds 
with practicality and common sense.20
It should come as no surprise that Caparo decided that the auditors were not liable 
for the economic loss of the investors on the basis that the auditors owed them no duty 
of care. In reaching this decision, the House of Lords determined that there existed no 
relationship of “proximity” between the auditors and the investors, notwithstanding that 
the use of the audit report by investors might be reasonably foreseeable to the auditors. 
Oddly enough, and despite their rejection of policy considerations underlying the Anns 
decision, the Lords in Caparo concluded, by necessary implication if not expressly, that 
there existed insufficient policy considerations to justify the extension of an auditor's 
duty of care beyond the bounds of the statutory stewardship purpose as contemplated 
in companies' legislation. In the final analysis, the Lords concluded that such an 
extension of liability was not in keeping with a “traditional categorization” philosophy, 
and would require, in the words of Lord Bridge of Harwich, “a legislative step which 
it would be for Parliament, not the courts, to take.”21
The Early Years and the Formative Years: an Overview
Throughout the fifty-year period from the early 1930s to the 1980s, courts in the U.S., 
Britain and Canada accepted the premise that auditors should be held accountable for 
negligent misrepresentations made in audit reports. However, a competing underlying 
concern has been a fear that the scope of the duty of care owed to third parties may be 
extended too far and that the tort of negligent misrepresentation might evolve too 
quickly and too broadly. The consequences of such an evolution would likely be the 
opening of the floodgates of civil liability against those professionals involved with the 
preparation of reports which may be used by people, and in circumstances, which were
20 Ibid at 585-586.
21 Ibid at 578.
In order to counter this concern, the courts adopted a variety of mechanisms. In the 
final analysis, these mechanisms can be described as a means of prescribing the scope 
of the duty of care to those “very persons” and to those “very transactions” which were 
actually known to the auditors at the time of making the report. And, from a Canadian 
standpoint, the only leading case to come before the Supreme Court of Canada during 
these years, Haig, did not offer the Court, because of the particular facts of that case, 
an opportunity to elaborate and to clarify such jurisprudence. It is against this backdrop 
of fifty years that the accounting profession, the users of financial statements, securities 
regulators and the Supreme Court of Canada found themselves when faced with the 
Hercules Managements and the Kripps decisions.
Recent History: Hercules & Kripps
Hercules Managements — Back To The Future
In considering the various legal issues before them in Hercules, the Supreme Court of 
Canada established several fundamental principles distinct from those pertaining to 
negligent misrepresentation. The Court established that an engagement letter between 
an auditor and a corporation does not establish a contractual right of action in favor of 
individual shareholders. The Court also ruled that an alleged breach by an auditor of 
a statutory obligation to remain independent from the company being audited does not 
give rise to a right of action or a duty of care to shareholders. These principles are an 
important indication of the Court's thinking as it considered the wider issues associated 
with auditor liability.
In summary, the Supreme Court ruled that the purpose of a statutory audit report 
was to enable shareholders as a group to assess management's stewardship of the assets 
of a corporation. The report was not intended to facilitate or promote investment 
decisions by current or prospective shareholders. In this sense, the decision of the 
Supreme Court is entirely consistent with that of the House of Lords in Caparo.
The Supreme Court of Canada also recognized that it would likely always be 
reasonably foreseeable to an auditor that a third party— such as a shareholder— would 
rely upon the audit report in making investment decisions. However, the Supreme 
Court of Canada, in recognition of the concerns of indeterminate liability which had 
traditionally guided previous decisions in various courts, also held that there were many 
policy considerations to justify a limitation on the scope of the duty of care to the 
immediate corporation and for the very purposes for which the audit report was given. 
In other words, liability is to be founded on the basis of “proximity of relationship” 
between the preparers and the users of the audit report, subject to policy considerations 
that might negate a duty of care.
In considering whether a duty of care existed between the maker and the recipient 
of a statement, the Supreme Court considered reasonable foreeability as well as 
reasonable reliance in determining whether there existed a prima facie “special 
relationship” between the maker and the recipient, a relationship described as a 
“relationship of proximity”. The Court concluded that such a relationship could not be 
established without reliance by the recipient upon the maker's words. Justice La Forest 
wrote:
To my mind, proximity can be seen to inhere ... when ... (a) the defendant ought 
reasonably to foresee that the plaintiff will rely on his or her representation; and (b) 
reliance by the plaintiff would, in the particular circumstances of the case, be 
reasonable.22
In order to establish liability, the plaintiff-representee must demonstrate these 
factors in order to prove its proximity to the auditor. Then, even if such a relationship 
can be established, the Court must then consider whether the scope of the duty of care 
should be negated by policy considerations. The Supreme Court concluded that such 
a relationship of proximity between the auditor and shareholders — current and 
prospective — would almost always be established. Hence, in Canada today, one can 
say with a great deal of confidence that there is a prima facie duty of care between an 
auditor and the shareholders of a corporation. However, in a case involving the 
traditional y ear-end audit of a privately held corporation, policy considerations directed 
towards precluding “liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to 
an indeterminate class” mean that auditors owe no duty of care to individual 
shareholders for the results of their investment decisions.
In the first instance, La Forest J's decision in Hercules may appear to some to be a 
regressive statement of the law as it pertains to auditors. Clearly, the Court in Hercules 
did not consider itself bound by Dickson J's view, as expressed in Haig, of the 
importance of the audit report to capital markets. Dickson J. identified the stewardship 
function as merely one element of the wider purposes of an audit report, even for 
private, closely held corporations. The Court's decision in Haig can be reconciled to 
the decision in Hercules by virtue of the principle that, on the basis of the facts in Haig, 
there was no risk of indeterminate liability.
In our opinion, the decision in Hercules is an acknowledgement that the law 
pertaining to auditor liability — or any other instance of the law of negligence — must 
and will continue to evolve as the Courts assess the ever-changing needs of Canada's 
business community. Furthermore, there are ample grounds for the belief that such 
change will occur much more quickly in Canada than in other common law 
jurisdictions, such as Britain. How can such a view be supported, especially in light 
of the Court's decision in Hercules'?
22 Hercules supra note 1 at 188.
It must be recognized that the Supreme Court in Hercules enunciated its 
unequivocal support for Lord Wilberforce's decision in Anns. Furthermore, theCourt 
refused to sanction a view that such two-part test should be restricted to the tort of 
negligent misrepresentation or claims involving economic loss. As Justice La Forest 
stated:
[T]his two-stage approach has been applied by this Court in the context of various types 
of negligence actions, including actions involving claims for different forms of 
economic loss... to create a “pocket” of negligent misrepresentation cases... in which 
the existence of a duty of care is determined differently from other negligence cases 
would, in our view, be incorrect.23
Finally, it must also be recognized that this affirmation of the two-part test of Anns 
stands in marked contrast to the rejection of it by the House of Lords in Caparo. Hence, 
the Supreme Court of Canada in Hercules has demonstrated a “modem approach”, 
rather than a desire to cling to “traditional categories” of precedents, in considering the 
development of the law of negligence.
Kripps v. Touche Ross — Confusion Abounds
In Kripps, the auditors were engaged for the sole purpose of satisfying the regulatory 
requirements with respect to the annual prospectus that a publicly traded company had 
to submit to the provincial Superintendent of Brokers. Hence, the audit report in issue 
was never intended to serve only the stewardship function traditionally associated with 
year-end audit reports submitted to shareholders in accordance with companies 
legislation. Furthermore, the audit report was included in the prospectus pursuant to 
section 46(3) of the BC Securities Act24, which required, amongst other things, that the 
auditor provide the Superintendent with,
a statement that he has read the prospectus and that the information contained in it, 
which is derived from the financial statements contained in the prospectus or which is 
within his knowledge, is, in his opinion, presented fairly and is not misleading. 
[emphasis added]
Kripps involved an action on the basis of the common law tort of negligent 
misrepresentation. The case did not involve statutory civil liability under the Securities 
Act, since no such provisions existed at the time in question so as to establish a statutory 
cause of action. In arriving at its decision, the B.C. Court of Appeal appears to have 
“blurred” the distinction between a regular year-end audit report and the particular 
obligations imposed upon auditors pursuant to securities legislation. For example, the 
Court held that “the aim of an auditor's report is to allow auditors to provide their
23 Ibid. at 185-186.
24 R.S.B.C. 1979, c.380.
professional opinion which may be relied upon as a guide to business planning and 
investment.”25 This view of the purpose of an auditor's report goes well beyond the 
view later expressed by the Supreme Court in Hercules and that of the House of Lords 
in Caparo. Even if this view were intended to apply only to a publicly traded company, 
it would, nevertheless, still represent an extension beyond the view expressed in 
Ultramares with respect to the scope of the duty of care owed to readers of the report.
In reality, the B.C. Court of Appeal in Kripps never expressly contemplated the 
very issue which had consumed the attention of every court which had previously 
addressed the matter of auditor liability— that is, the scope of the duty of care. Rather, 
perhaps due to the fact that the inclusion of the audit opinion in a prospectus gave rise 
to a presumption that the auditors agreed to be answerable to those who would rely on 
that prospectus to invest, the Court shifted its attention to a consideration of what the 
appropriate standards were.
In fact, the only express comment made in Kripps with respect to the scope of the 
duty of care is to be found where the Court refers to the auditor's “specific knowledge 
of the defendant in this case.”26 Hence, one can only conclude that the BC Court of 
Appeal, and by necessary implication the Supreme Court of Canada, did not have fears 
of “liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate 
class”, given the relationship of proximity between the defendant/ auditors and the 
investor/plaintiffs.
On one issue that touches on the duty of care, although not with respect to the 
problem of indeterminacy of exposure, the British Columbia Courts took a view which 
opens a new indeterminacy: on which representations will the duty be owed? Perhaps 
one of the most difficult questions raised by the Kripps decision arises from the fact that 
the financial statements had been altered by the client after the audit opinion was issued 
and before the financial statements with the opinion were included in the prospectus. 
The alteration was with respect to a note disclosure regarding the very loans in dispute.
Initially, the auditor had suggested to his client that some disclosure be made with 
respect to the loans in arrears and he drafted a note which was fairly alarming. The 
client balked. After discussion, a revised note was agreed upon which talked about 
“non-performing loans”. The Court referred to expert evidence to the effect that “non­
performing loans” was not a term of art and did not have, at the time, a recognized 
meaning. As a result, the Court of Appeal held that the note as agreed by the auditor, 
and as inserted in the original financial statements on which the audit opinion was 
expressed, was not sufficiently informative and therefore was in itself misleading.
25 Kripps supra note 2 at 439.
26 Ibid. at 442.
Nevertheless, the client removed the note from the financial statements and inserted 
another paragraph, elsewhere in the prospectus, which according to the trial judge, was 
even less alarming than the agreed note about its loan portfolio. The Defendants, of 
course, argued that regardless of all the other issues raised, the financial statements in 
the prospectus were not the ones on which they had given an opinion and therefore, no 
duty of care could arise towards users of those other altered financial statements.
Since the Court of Appeal had come to the conclusion that the note which had been 
in the financial statements on which the auditors opined was inadequate, it ruled that the 
financial statements as published in the prospectus were “materially the same”. The 
minor alternations did not negate the duty of the care.
In our view, this conclusion was surprising. The note had been fought over and 
then deliberately deleted by the client, facts which might have led one to the conclusion 
that at least the client believed that the deletion of the note from the financial statements 
and moving it, in a water-downed form, to another place in the prospectus, would in fact 
enhance its ability to raise capital. The Court of Appeal does not refer to specific 
evidence given by the Plaintiff as to his view of the difference nor to any expert 
evidence led by the Plaintiff as to a reasonable investor's interpretation of the two 
different disclosures. However, even this debate might miss a more important point: 
whether or not the alteration was material in the sense of having caused that particular 
Plaintiff to change his mind, there is a more significant policy issue as to whether the 
integrity of the financial statements on which an auditor gives his opinion must be 
protected by the Courts. What degree of alteration will be condoned as acceptable? In 
our view, the capital markets must respond “none”. Although this might leave 
otherwise deserving Plaintiffs without a deep pocket for compensation, it is our view 
that the imposition of liability on auditors in circumstances where the financial 
statements have been altered gives the wrong message as to the degree to which a Court 
will condone, directly or indirectly, alterations of a professional's opinion.
The Standard of Care: The Kripps Issue
As indicated in our introduction, the third element in the tort of negligent 
misrepresentation is that the statement, which was false, was made negligently. At first 
glance, the principle seems to be fairly simple: there is no strict liability for making 
false or misleading statements. The Courts will only award compensation to the 
Plaintiff if the Defendant did not take adequate care to ensure that the representation 
was free from error and not misleading (obviously, if the person making the statement 
deliberately misled the Plaintiff, the situation is one of fraud which is governed by its 
own set of rules).
Where the representation is with respect to a complex technical subject matter or 
is given in the form of an opinion (i.e. the assertion is couched in terms which imply
that there is a significant degree of judgment involved), the question of negligence, or 
standard of care, is often difficult to apply in practice. Generally speaking, the standard 
would be the standard of the representor's peers. Courts have stated that one compares 
the professional to reasonably competent professionals in similar circumstances. This 
would lead to fairly obvious corollaries, such as the rule that one must not judge the 
professional with hindsight and that, in the absence of any specific representation as to 
special skill, one does not judge a general practitioner against the standard of the 
specialist. It also leads to the principle that not every error made by a professional is 
culpable. Professional peers, in similar circumstances, can easily have differing views 
and as long as the view arrived at was not perverse and in fact took into consideration 
relevant factors which would be recognized as such by the professional's peers at the 
time, the fact that the professional “got it wrong” ought not to matter. Lord Denning, 
whilst sitting in judgment in the Court of Appeal in the case of an action against an 
obstetrician, pointed out that his judgments were frequently overturned by the House 
of Lords. He recognized that whilst this means that his judgment was later proved to 
be wrong, he observed that this was not tantamount to admitting that he had been 
negligent in arriving at those decisions.27
By what standard, then, should a Court assess the opinion of a professional? From 
a practical viewpoint, the answer is often expert evidence. Both sides to the dispute will 
find experts in the field who will, under oath, inform the Court as to their view of what 
the Defendant's peers would have done in similar circumstances. The Court will assess 
the credibility of the expert witnesses, the thoroughness with which they reviewed the 
file, whether or not the assumptions they made were ultimately proven as facts to the 
satisfaction of the Court and the logic and persuasiveness of their conclusions. From 
time to time, however, the Courts will be dissatisfied with all the expert evidence put 
before them or will have significant difficulty accepting that the standard of care thus 
presented is appropriate. Within the last decade, the Supreme Court of Canada has dealt 
with this issue twice. The Kripps judgment was the first case of auditors' liability 
subsequent to these two Supreme Court decisions to look at this issue in the context of 
an audit opinion.
In reviewing the cases which preceded the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
decision in Kripps, and comparing those cases with Kripps, we will be proposing that 
Kripps must be read on the very narrow basis of its own facts, for two reasons. First, 
we are of the view that a wide reading of the Kripps decision would lead to a 
proposition of law which is significantly different from the cases which preceded it. 
Given that two of those cases are Supreme Court of Canada judgments, this is a result 
to be avoided. Second, unlike the two Supreme Court of Canada cases which preceded 
it, Kripps was dealing the case of an audit opinion and, in our view, failed to consider 
certain implications which arise out of the fact that the auditor's choices are limited with
27 Whitehouse v Jordan, [1980] 1 All E.R. 650 (C.A.).
respect to the form and content of the opinion that he can render. Finally, we consider 
the impact of the Kripps judgment with respect to forged financial statements. We 
believe that if the Kripps decision is generally followed in this respect, it will create 
serious difficulty for auditing and other professions, as well as for the stability of 
Canada's capital markets.
Expert Evidence
As indicated above, Canadian courts have grappled with the issue of the weight of 
expert evidence in numerous cases over the last number of years. In Roberge v. 
Bolduc,28 the Supreme Court of Canada was called upon to render judgment in a case 
involving an opinion on title given by a notary in Quebec. Although Quebec rules of 
civil liability differ somewhat from common law rules, and although different 
terminology is used, the general rule that a professional will not be held liable if he acts 
in a manner consistent with that of the reasonable professional in similar circumstances, 
is basically the same. The Supreme Court had made the determination that the notary 
had in fact committed an error when he gave his opinion as to the title. In order to 
demonstrate, however, that the error was not negligent, the Defendant notary had 
introduced expert testimony. Much to the chagrin of the Court, the experts advised the 
Court that the opinion rendered by the notary in question was indeed similar to other 
opinions rendered generally by notaries in Quebec. In other words, the experts appear 
to have told the Court that everyone was making the same mistake. The Court quickly 
came to the conclusion that as a final arbiter on legal issues, it did not require (or 
appreciate) expert evidence, the purpose of which would be to advise the Court on the 
basic issue as to whether the opinion was right or wrong. However, the expert evidence 
was admissible with respect to common practice.
The Supreme Court held, however, that the judge is not bound by the expert 
evidence, even if, as in this case, such evidence was unanimous as to the current 
practice. In part, the Court's comfort in dismissing the unanimous expert evidence was 
based on the fact that in the field of law, unlike other cases of alleged professional 
negligence, it is not the case that the expert is the specialist and the judge is the layman: 
the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada are the supreme experts. The language of 
the judgment, however, is not restricted to cases of liability for legal malpractice. The 
Court held that it is entitled not only to assess the practitioner against the practice of his 
peers, but also to assess the reasonableness of that practice:
that the appellant notary acted in accordance with the then general notarial 
practice does not seem to be contested. Neither the trial judge nor the 
respondents suggest otherwise. It is not sufficient, however, in my view that
28 [1991] 1 S.C.R. 374.
the common professional practice be followed in order to avoid liability. The 
practice has to be demonstrably reasonable, [emphasis added]29
In short, the Court held that following the practice of one's peers is strong evidence of 
appropriate conduct, but is not determinative:
[I]f the practice is not in accordance with the general standards of liability, i.e., that one 
must act in a reasonable manner, then the professional who adheres to such a practice 
can be found liable, depending on the facts of each case.30
In other words, even if the majority of professionals behave in a certain fashion, if 
that fashion is in and of itself unreasonable, the Court will still find the individual 
professional negligent.
As indicated above, the Court no doubt felt fairly comfortable with assessing the 
reasonableness of notarial practice where that practice routinely (according to the 
experts) overlooked a fundamental legal concept which ought to have impacted 
significantly on the opinion of title. How does the Court, however, make this 
assessment when the professional activity at issue is one in which the Court is truly a 
layman, and the experts are the only specialists?
The Supreme Court of Canada answered this question in the more recent case of 
terNeuzen v. Korn,31 a case concerning medical malpractice. In this case, the Defendant 
doctor had failed to advise his patient that she could contract HIV from artificial 
insemination. The patient underwent the artificial insemination procedure in January 
1985, at a time when, according to the evidence, knowledge about HIV was rapidly 
growing, but was still in its infancy and fairly confusing. Although the Defendant 
doctor knew that it was transmissible by heterosexual sex and blood transfusions, he did 
not know that it could be transmitted through artificial insemination and argued that this 
knowledge was not disseminated at conferences he attended nor in the medical journals 
he read. Expert evidence was to the effect that the artificial insemination practice of the 
Defendant doctor was in keeping with general practice across Canada.
After agreeing that the starting point for a determination of negligence was the 
practice of similar professionals in similar circumstances, to be judged without the 
benefit of hindsight, the Court held that following general practice is not necessarily 
enough. In discussing the difficult issue as to when the Court can substitute its view of 
what ought to be general practice for what the experts say was in fact general practice, 
the Supreme Court stated that:
29 Ibid. at 434.
30 Ibid. at 437.
31 [1995] 3 S.C.R. 674. [hereinafter ter Neuzen].
It is generally accepted that when a doctor acts in accordance with a recognized and 
respectable practice of the profession, he or she will not be found to be negligent. This 
is because Courts do not ordinarily have the expertise to tell professionals that they are 
not behaving appropriately in their field. In a sense, the medical professional as a whole 
is assumed to have adopted procedures which are in the best interests of patients and are 
not inherently negligent.32
Referring to the Roberge v. Bolduc33, however, the Court affirmed that where the 
custom of an entire profession “ignores the elementary dictates of caution”34, following 
the general custom will not insulate the practitioner from a finding of negligence. After 
reviewing other cases, Mr. Justice Sopinka articulated a proposition which helps to 
identify when such a substitution of view can legitimately be made:
I conclude from the foregoing that, as a general rule, where a procedure involves 
difficult or uncertain questions of medical treatment or complex, scientific or highly 
technical matters that are beyond the ordinary experience and understanding of a judge 
or jury, it will not be open to find a standard medical practice negligent. On the other 
hand, as an exception to the general rule, if a standard practice fails to adopt obvious 
and reasonable precautions which are readily apparent to the ordinary finder of fact, 
then it is no excuse for a practitioner to claim that he or she was merely conforming to 
such a negligent common practice.35
The Audit Opinion
So how does this apply to auditors, and more particularly, to the judgment in Krippsl 
In our view, the Court of Appeal in the Kripps decision was really saying two things. 
First, the Court of Appeal held that the auditor in question knew the precise purpose to 
which the financial statements would be put, namely, to induce the Plaintiff to buy 
debentures in the company being audited. The Court also held that the auditor knew 
that there was information not disclosed in the financial statements which would be 
material to that decision. Although the expert opinions given were unanimous, that 
GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) did not require the disclosure of 
that specific information (and it is described at some portions in the judgment as being 
the disclosure of the amount of loans in arrears and in other places in the judgment as 
the disclosure of the amount of capitalized interest), in light of the auditor's specific 
knowledge, he had acted negligently. Although there is clearly room for debate as to 
whether this is a correct interpretation of the judgment and if so, whether the judgment 
was a correct interpretation of professional standards, we are of the view that a narrow
32 Ibid. at 695.
33 Supra, note 19.
34 Supra, note 31 at 697.
« Ibid. at 701.
interpretation of the case such as this, which ties the result to the specific finding of 
facts, is the only one which might not present irreconcilable conflict with the Supreme 
Court of Canada cases cited above.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal, however, went much further. The Court of 
Appeal also questioned the validity of GAAP as the standard against which 
misrepresentations ought to be judged. It held that in fact the standards of GAAP were 
under discussion at the time and that they subsequently required explicit disclosure of 
unpaid interest. (It is interesting that the Court never identified the new section of the 
Handbook to which it was referrring.) The Court of Appeal of British Columbia 
rejected the argument that was made to the effect that if the statements were in 
accordance with GAAP (and the expert evidence was to the effect that GAAP did not 
require the disclosure which the judge and the Plaintiff would have wished), then the 
representation made by the auditor, embodied in the standard form audit opinion, was 
not misleading. The Court of Appeal seems to have rejected this argument on two 
grounds.
We will deal with the second ground first because we believe that it is in direct 
contradiction to the judgment in Hercules and therefore must be seen as having been 
supplanted by Hercules. The majority of the Court described the aim of the audit report 
as a guide to business planning and investment. The Court then went on to state as 
follows:
GAAP may be their guide to forming this opinion, but auditors are retained to form an 
opinion on the fairness of the financial statements, not merely on their conformity to 
GAAP ... auditors cannot hide behind the qualification to their reports (“according to 
GAAP”) where the financial statements nevertheless misrepresent the financial position 
of the company.36
The Supreme Court of Canada, just one month later, pointed out that although it is 
certainly foreseeable that various uses will be made of the audit report, the Court will 
not come to the assistance of those who so use the report unless a special relationship, 
premised on the auditor's actual knowledge of that use, has been proven. In other 
words, on the facts as found in this case (the Court of Appeal held that the auditor in 
question knew the specific use in question), the conclusion might be consistent with the 
Hercules decision, but the statement that the aim of the audit report is to guide business 
planning and investment is not the law in Canada with respect to statutory annual audit 
opinions.
The second branch of this part of the judgment is even more difficult. As evidenced 
from the quote above, the British Columbia Court of Appeal is dissatisfied with the 
language of the standard form audit opinion. In fact, at paragraph 62 of the judgment,
36 Kripp supra note 2 at 439.
the Court of Appeal rejected the notion that GAAP must be referred to as the “lingua 
franca” of capital markets because, in the Court's view, the standard opinion to the 
effect that the financial statements present fairly the financial position of the company 
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, is ambiguous: it does not 
state either that there is fair presentation nor that the financial statements are in 
accordance with the GAAP. It is possible that the Court merely intended to hold the 
auditor to the statutory opinion found in section 46(3) of the B.C. Securities Act as it 
then existed, rather than allowing the auditor to use the standard form opinion (the 
difference is between simply “presenting fairly” and “presenting fairly in accordance 
with GAAP”).
If, however, the Court intended this statement to apply to all standard form audit 
opinions, including those issued within a statutory framework which calls for an opinion 
on “fairness in accordance with GAAP”, then in our view, it cannot be reconciled with 
the Supreme Court of Canada decisions of the same decade. Unless the Court of Appeal 
was of the view that the debate in the profession which allegedly brought about changes 
in 1985 to presentation requirements under GAAP was devoid of any serious meaning 
because it was obvious, even to a layman, that the failure to require disclosure of the 
amount of loans in arrears or of the amount of interest being capitalized was 
demonstrably unreasonable (an assertion which the Court of Appeal did not make), then 
according to the test to set out by the Supreme Court of Canada, the finder of fact has 
no choice but to compare the behaviour of the individual professional against the 
standard of the time. In our view, this contradiction is to be avoided if possible, and 
therefore the best interpretation of the Kripps case would be as a fact-specific case.
This brings us to a consideration as to whether the law should be different for 
auditors and for other professionals. In our view, an argument for this proposition is 
available, but the argument ought to have led the British Columbia Court of Appeal to 
the opposite conclusion.
Unlike the opinion rendered by the notary in Roberge v. Bolduc or the warning (or 
failure to give warning) in terNeuzen, when an auditor is appointed under statute, she 
often has very little choice as to the content or form of the opinion which she gives. 
The Court of Appeal recognized this at the outset of the majority judgment in Kripps 
(which did not faithfully reflect the Securities Act) where it was indicated that under the 
Securities Act, the financial statements and an auditor's report are required to form part 
of the prospectus and there is a further requirement that “this auditor's report states that 
the financial statements presented the financial position of the company fairly according 
to GAAP, and that otherwise the report be unqualified.”37
37 Kripps supra note 2 at 426.
In other words, it would seem apparent from this passage of the Court of Appeal 
judgment that the auditor had no choice in using the language proposed by the CICA 
Handbook for a clean opinion whether or not that language is, in the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal's view, ambiguous. Moreover, this is not merely the standard of the 
profession, but is in most cases, a legislative requirement. Although the point made by 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal to the effect that the law cannot allow a 
profession to insulate its members from the consequences of head-in-the-sand tactics 
is well taken, we would argue that this concern is misplaced where the legislature has, 
by statute, directed the form and content of the opinion which is to be rendered. The 
auditor is then left with no choice but to issue a clean opinion or not. He is not left with 
the choice to amend the client's representation, namely, the financial statements. 
Moreover, unlike the case in ter Neuzen, there was no direct communication between 
the Plaintiff and the auditor and therefore the representation is no more or less than the 
standard form audit opinion. If the Court of Appeal is correct that the opinion is 
ambiguous, it is difficult to see how reliance thereon is reasonable. Presumably, it is 
reasonable because it is a standard form opinion and has come to take on a specific 
meaning within that community which prepares, audits and uses financial statements. 
We are then thrown back to the proposition that if that community, as evidenced by 
expert testimony, understands what the opinion means and agrees that GAAP does not 
require the disclosure in question, the ultimate finding is difficult to reconcile with this 
portion of the judgment.
The Court of Appeal also made reference to an earlier British Columbia judgment 
which at first glance might support the conclusion that despite the high degree of 
technical difficulty, the Court is entitled to substitute its opinion for the standard of the 
auditing profession. That case was Revelstoke Credit Union v. Miller,38 in which the 
debate arose over the application of GAAS (Generally Accepted Accounting 
Standards). In short, in that case, the auditors had failed to detect fraud committed by 
the Credit Union's manager. In defending themselves, the auditors asserted that they 
had in fact carried out standard tests as called for by generally accepted auditing 
standards. The Court found that this was insufficient. At first glance, it therefore 
appears that this case stands for the proposition that the Court can substitute its 
judgment for what would be appropriate audit tests. However, we are of the view that 
a closer reading of the Revelstoke decision leads to a different conclusion. The Court 
in Revelstoke was simply saying, in our view, that the application of GAAS should be 
something other than mechanical. It is not enough to do the tests: one must interpret 
and analyze the results. The Court in Revelstoke held that if that had been done by the 
auditors, they would have recognized a series of red flags which by themselves should 
have obliged them to undertake further tests which might well have led to the discovery 
of the fraud. In other words, in our view, the Revelstoke decision did not question 
GAAS as fundamentally as certain passages of the Kripps decision question GAAP and
38 [1984] 2 W.W.R. 297 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter Revelstoke].
the standard form audit opinion; it merely stated that a professional is not only obliged 
to carry out the same steps that a reasonable professional in similar circumstances would 
have carried out, but also to pay attention to what he is doing and draw appropriate 
professional conclusions therefrom.
The Dissenting View
A veiy strong dissenting opinion was written in the Kripps case on many of the points 
outlined above. It remains to be seen whether this dissenting opinion will attract the 
attention of future Courts. One is reminded of the fact that the law of negligent 
misstatement involving auditors began as a result of a dissenting opinion by Lord 
Denning in a judgment rendered in an era when no action lay for pure economic loss.
The dissenting judge pointed out that the auditors were required, both by the 
engagement and statute, to give an opinion on whether the financial statements 
presented fairly in accordance with GAAP. Relying on GAAP, therefore, in her view, 
was not “hiding behind” anything, but was merely answering the question as it had been 
posed. The dissenting judge was of the view that failing to answer a different question 
that was never asked (is there any additional information which I, as an investor, would 
find material, even if that information is not required to be disclosed to me by virtue of 
GAAP in financial Statements?) cannot be the basis for a finding of negligence of the 
company's auditors.
The dissenting judge concluded that her colleagues on the Court of Appeal had 
simply come to the conclusion that GAAP themselves were inadequate. In her view, 
whether or not that was true, it does not assist the investors in their action against the 
auditors. The auditors were asked to determine what GAAP then was and then to state 
whether the financial statements were prepared in accordance with them. She was of 
the view the auditors successfully completed that engagement. As she put it:
[T]hey are not accused of negligently determining the proper generally accepted 
accounting principles, they are accused of failing to state that the prevailing principles 
were inadequate. In my view they were under no obligation to offer such an opinion.39
39 Kripps supra note 2 at 456.
In some sense, the dissenting view might be seen as going beyond the degree of 
deference which the Supreme Court of Canada has told us that, in the case of other 
professionals, must be shown to the profession. It is unclear whether her determination 
that a finding that GAAP were themselves inadequate is insufficient to assist the 
plaintiffs because the plaintiffs did not show that GAAP were so inadequate as to be 
“demonstrably unreasonable” or whether she was of the view that, in the circumstances, 
even that would not have been enough. In our view, either one of these two rationales 
would be sufficient for the decision.
Clearly, there is nothing in the majority opinion which indicates that in the Court 
of Appeal's decision the lack of disclosure requirements at the time in question was 
“demonstrably unreasonable”. The best spin one can put on the judgment is that the 
Court of Appeal felt that the failure to require disclosure was “demonstrably wrong”, 
given the judge's statement that the standard setters themselves modified the CICA 
Handbook in this regard the following year. Presumably, the mere fact that a 
profession's standards evolve with the times does not by itself indicate that at any point 
in the process the previous set of rules was “demonstrably unreasonable” in the sense 
we believe was required by the Supreme Court of Canada.
As indicated above, the dissenting judge might even have adopted a stronger view 
point, namely, that in light of the actual words of the opinion given by the auditors, the 
general rule articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada to the effect that a lay bench 
can come to the conclusion that a professional was negligent despite having followed 
the standards of his profession at the relevant time, would not apply in the case of the 
standard form audit opinion. By referring back to the words of the opinion, she is 
indicating that the professional has properly qualified his opinion as being in 
accordance with GAAP and therefore, if the recipient is not satisfied with the level of 
information that GAAP requires, it is up to him to ask for a special report or further 
information. Such a strong view might be fairly controversial. It might be analogous, 
for example, in the case of medical negligence to defend a doctor who had rendered a 
diagnosis after warning his patient that he had only considered some, but not all 
possibilities or having performed some but not all diagnostic tests. Would we be 
content with a system which allowed the doctor to escape liability because, given the 
tests he did perform, the diagnosis was not unreasonable, or would we want to know 
whether it was reasonable for him to have performed only those tests? Would we 
demand that the patient seek another opinion from a doctor who was willing to perform 
those additional tests? In actual practice, however, doctors do not regularly limit their 
medical opinions in the way that the standard form audit opinion does. Therefore, it can
be said that, as a society, we do accept such qualified opinions from auditors in a way 
we do not normally accept from doctors. Following this line of argument, one could 
argue that the exception to the rule that expert evidence ought to prevail found in the 
Supreme Court of Canada in the cases decided above should not be applied to the 
standard of GAAP in the case of a standard form audit opinion.
Implication of Hercules Managements & Kripps
The decisions in the Hercules and Kripps cases have brought to the surface a number 
of issues pertaining to auditor liability in Canada. It would be naïve to believe that the 
legal wrangling is over. Indeed, in the opinion of some commentators, the courts have 
failed to provide any definitive principles, which would have resolved the issue once 
and for all.
Whatever one's opinion of the decision in Hercules, that case has allowed the 
Supreme Court to express very forcefully its views regarding auditor liability. There 
are some that would believe that the decision has caused, or at least has hastened, the 
demise of the annual statutory audit. Professor A1 Rosen of York University in Toronto 
was quoted as follows:
The annual financial statement is now a joke. Public accountants may think this is a
wonderful win for them. But in the long run I see this as a disaster. Who really needs
an audit of financial statements that are not useful for investor decision-making?40
While we would agree that traditional historic cost financial statements cannot be the 
sole basis of investment decisions, we disagree with the premise that the Supreme Court 
decision in Hercules has caused their demise. First of all, the vast majority of the audits 
of public and private corporations are conducted and the financial statements thereof 
are prepared in accordance with proper auditing and accounting standards. Secondly, 
to the extent that historic cost financial statements have many inherent limitations from 
an investment perspective, this was true for many years prior to the Hercules decision. 
Finally, generally speaking, these limitations are or should be well recognized by 
investors, with the result that sound investment decisions are guided by information 
from a variety of sources rather than simply the information contained in the audit 
report and a corporation's financial statements.
40 “Auditors not legally liable to investors, top court rules” The Financial Post (24 May 1997) at 
3.
There are also those who believe that governments must legislate a cause of action 
in order to give investors an avenue of relief against the “narrow” scope of liability 
imposed as a result of Hercules. The Editorial in the Financial Post read:
Provincial governments should quickly establish new securities law that makes a 
negligent auditor liable when investors lose money after relying on a company's audited 
financial statements to buy or sell shares.41
Such views appear to completely ignore the principle of causation, and would treat 
auditors as guarantors of a safe return on investment. In addition, such views ignore the 
statutory causes of action which already exist in securities legislation when audit reports 
and financial statements are included in a prospectus. Finally, the editors appear not to 
have recognized that the ultimate responsibility for the accuracy of the financial 
information upon which investors make decisions rests with the management of the 
corporation rather than the auditor.
And, what of the Kripps decision? The decision of the Supreme Court to dismiss 
the application for leave to appeal without commenting on the merits of the case has 
thrown the law surrounding auditor liability into a state of confusion and uncertainty. 
The confusion and uncertainty does not stem from concerns surrounding the scope of 
the duty of care, since, in Kripps, the auditors were certainly aware that their audit 
report would be used for investment purposes. They were also aware of the general 
class of users of the report. Hence, akin to Lord Denning's conclusion in Candler and 
that of Justice Cardozo in Glanzer and that of Justice Dickson in Haig, the auditors in 
Kripps did not attempt to defend the action on the basis of potential “indeterminate 
liability”. Rather, the confusion and uncertainty arises from concerns regarding the 
appropriate standard of care against which the conduct of auditors should be measured.
There are those who will look to the decision in Kripps as evidence to support their 
view that GAAP and GAAS, as found principally in the CICA Handbook, may 
sometimes be deficient, with the result that financial reporting standards and auditing 
standards are below the needs of the financial and business communities. Those who 
might take this view would do well to consider the words of the Court of Appeal, 
whereby the Court acknowledged that
41 “Editorial Opinion” The Financial Post (27 May 1997) at 18.
the amount of arrears was not disclosed. This w as... the universal practice of financial 
companies like VMCL. It was the considered approach of the Chartered Accountants 
as a profession, and thus a practice not to be lightly disturbed.42
In our view, the significance of Kripps should be measured against the backdrop of 
a discrete form of statutory liability, which, we submit, may have pervaded the entire 
case. While the case was framed on the basis of the common law tort of negligent 
misrepresentation, it must be recognized that section 46(3) of the then B.C. Securities 
Act contained no qualifier to the phrase “presented fairly”. That is, there was no 
criterion in section 46(3) by which the “fairness” of presentation was to be measured. 
In reality, in reporting to the Superintendent, the auditor was expected to state, without 
any reservation and as a matter of fact, that the information contained in the prospectus 
“is presented fairly and is not misleading”.
It is submitted that the level of assurance required for giving an opinion on 
“fairness” without tying that to a defined standard, if possible at all, approximates that 
of a guarantee of accuracy, and is founded on a fundamental disagreement with the 
principle that the fairness of presentation must be measured, and can only be measured, 
against the criteria of a recognized framework, such as Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). Fairness of presentation cannot exist in a vacuum, despite the 
wording of any legislation.
The Kripps judgment raises numerous issues, and it is difficult to predict what 
impact the decision will have on future cases. On the issue of the circumstances under 
which a judge should substitute his opinion for those of experts and declare that if 
generally accepted accounting principles do not call for a certain disclosure, then those 
principles can be deemed deficient, there will be little change. As explained, the 
principle that judges can, in exceptional circumstances, substitute their judgments for 
those of experts, is well enshrined in our law. Although we have quarreled with the 
application of this principle to the facts in the Kripps' case, it remains just that: an 
application of a principle to a set of facts, and therefore is unlikely to be relevant to a 
different set of facts.
However, on two other issues, one might expect more reaction. First, the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal has told us that it finds the standard audit opinion to be
42 Kripps supra note 2 at 442-443.
misleading. However, there are no current plans afoot from within the profession to 
change the standard form wording nor have the legislatures across the country who have 
endorsed the standard form wording either directly (by reiterating the standard formula 
in the statute) or indirectly (by identifying the CICA Handbook as the principal source 
of GAAP which they have required companies to use) made any announcements that 
they will be revisiting this endorsement. The standard form opinion remains alive and 
well and in use; thousands of such opinions have no doubt been signed across Canada 
since the Kripps ruling. Either the vast majority of users understand what the standard 
form opinion means, or we are all operating in a communication gap which is larger 
than any of us dare think.
Second, the issue of forged or altered financial statements is one which should 
receive attention. Recent proposals published by the Ontario Securities Commission 
in its May 29, 1998 bulletin43 would deal with this issue head on. For example, 
amendments to the Ontario Securities Act are proposed which would impose statutoiy 
liability for continuous disclosure. In those sections dealing with an expert's opinion, 
the proposed statutory language would specifically relieve experts of liability where 
they prove that written consent to the use of their report or opinion had not been 
obtained or where a reference to or a guide from a report did not fairly represent the 
report's contents. In the latter case, the expert would have an obligation to inform the 
Commission that his report had been misconstrued or misinterpreted as soon as 
practicable after learning that such misuse of his opinion had been made. Whether or 
not these specific amendments are ever adopted as law, it is hoped that all professionals 
can look forward to such an attitude towards forgery and alteration being adopted by 
the courts and by Canadian legislatures.
The Future of Assurance Services and Auditor Liability
The development of accounting principles and auditing standards in Canada have a 
pervasive effect on Canadian business and the capital markets. Hence, a consideration 
of the current status of the law of auditor liability and its application to the future 
evolution of the auditing profession is more than simply an academic exercise. These 
issues do have and will continue to have a dramatic effect on individual Canadians, the 
business community and society.
43 (1988)21 O.S.C.B. 3367.
The annual audit of historic cost financial statements, for both private and public 
corporations, arguably cannot and should not be the only information source used by 
investors and lenders who are looking for assurances when advancing loans. The capital 
markets desire real-time “current” financial results of operations in order to meet the 
needs of investors. As the courts accept this reality, investors will lose the ability to sue 
auditors for failing to tell them everything they needed to know.
Simultaneously, auditors are also being called upon to provide new assurance 
services demanded by sophisticated investors. To an ever-increasing degree, this will 
mean providing assurance services — lending credibility to financial information— in 
an electronic environment. It will also likely mean providing assurance via the use of 
performance measurement criteria other than dollars and cents.
It is against this backdrop that the jurisprudence on auditor liability should be 
assessed, and the implication of the law on the tort of negligent misrepresentation 
measured in terms of its effect on the auditing profession. In our opinion, the decision 
of the B.C. Court of Appeal in Kripps should pose no great risk or hurdle to auditors as 
they deliver new assurance services in the context of a global economy. Stated simply, 
if a new brand of reporting principles becomes “generally accepted” by the preparers 
and the users of the financial information, whatever the form of such information, and 
if “new” generally auditing standards are adopted under which auditors will conduct 
audits of the financial information, these new reporting standards will become the 
criteria by which the “fairness of presentation” of the financial information will be 
measured.
As we said earlier, the fairness of presentation cannot exist in a vacuum. We expect 
the reporting standards to continue to evolve to meet the needs of the new world 
economy. However, we remain of the opinion that government, the business 
community as well as the courts will recognize that some criteria will be necessary by 
which “fairness” must be measured if the financial information is to have any utility and 
if auditors are expected to fulfill their role in providing assurance thereon. Hence, the 
reasoning of the court in Kripps should not, in our opinion, be adopted in future cases 
and should not cause undue concern to auditors as assurance services evolve.
The greatest risk to auditors in providing these new services will continue to be the 
scope of the duty of care owed by auditors to third parties. For private, closely held 
corporations, it will be difficult for auditors to overcome the argument that they owe a 
prima facie duty of care to the existing and prospective shareholders. In the context of
publicly traded companies, auditors will be called upon to provide assurance on 
financial information beyond that of the year-end financial statements. Hence, auditors 
might no longer be able to rely upon the premise that the audit report was prepared 
simply to allow shareholders to assess management's stewardship of the company's 
assets.
It is possible, for example, that new “special purpose” assurance reports will be 
issued periodically, and not in lieu of the statutory audit report. Furthermore, given the 
needs of the capital markets, the assurance reports will be intended for wide 
distribution. The auditors, in advance of the preparation and distribution of the reports, 
will know, at least in a very broad sense, the intended users and the intended use of the 
reports and can take appropriate steps to manage the associated risk, or decline the 
engagement if they cannot do so. In such circumstances, how will the duty of care 
concept evolve outside the statutory audit, where there is no legislative “purpose” to 
define the limited class to whom the duty is owed?
In our opinion, the risk of “liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate 
time to an indeterminate class” will shift focus as auditors choose to deliberately take 
up the challenge (as well as the financial rewards) of providing assurance services for 
the benefit of individuals whose interest in the subject matter is not defined by existing 
legislation. To the extent that auditors provide more than historic cost financial 
information and statutory audits, new difficulties will arise in applying the policy 
considerations set out by the Supreme Court of Canada to palliate the concerns 
associated with expanding the scope of the duty of care owed by auditors to the readers 
of these new assurance reports. The equity of the Hercules decision lies in its granting 
of permission to auditors to choose whether to take on, decline, or negotiate a fair 
contract when the potential exposure associated with a proposed engagement is 
“indeterminate”. The challenge is to apply the test to new situations that have not yet 
been considered by any court of law.
There are a number of factors in support of this proposition. First, securities 
regulators will continue to press for legislation to establish a statutory cause of action 
in favor of investors, although as we have seen, not without limitations. Second, in 
order to appease the concerns of investors, the management of a publicly traded 
company may demand and obtain a written confirmation from the auditors regarding 
the intended use and the intended users of the assurance reports, thereby establishing 
a “relationship of proximity” between the auditors and the investors. Finally, other 
legislative changes, for example, proposed amendments at the federal level so as to
institute a form of modified proportionate liability in place of joint and several liability 
in conjunction with the audit of federally regulated financial institutions, and the 
creation in some provinces of Limited Liability Partnerships so as to afford a measure 
of protection for the personal assets of non-negligent partners, can give professionals 
some comfort and some degree of flexibility when undertaking new engagements in 
what is now unchartered territory.
What, then, should be the response of the auditing profession? Should the 
profession choose not to venture down the road of providing new assurance services for 
fear of attracting an unwelcome extension of the scope of their duty of care? Can the 
profession, regardless of the legal risks, afford to stand still?
In our view, there can be no turning back. Market demands are driving a need for 
new assurance services. It is inevitable that providers of these services will face 
uncertainty in the application of the “purpose” test as set out in Hercules to evolving 
fact patterns. The words of Mr. Justice Dickson in Haig of twenty years ago about the 
compexities of modem society changing the role and responsibilities of accountants 
might be even truer today.
The auditing profession will be obliged to continue to develop its own standards, 
but given that reality necessarily moves faster than standard setters and that standard 
setters move faster than the law, there will continue to be frontiers where professionals 
will act with little guidance. Despite Kripps, we believe that courts should and will 
continue to judge professionals in the context of the authoritative guidance that in fact 
existed at the time the services were performed, and not on a subsequent view of what 
they should have been. Obviously, the challenge is for the profession to continue 
vigilantly to update its standards and for practitioners to practice good risk management 
as the process of providing new and broader assurance services evolves.
